Abstract Rule-based argumentation systems are developed for reasoning about defeasible information. As a major feature, their logical language distinguishes between strict rules (encoding strict information) and defeasible rules (describing general behavior with exceptional cases). They build arguments by chaining such rules, define attacks between them, use a semantics for evaluating the arguments and finally identify the plausible conclusions that follow from the rules. Focusing on the family of inconsistency-based attack relations, this paper presents the first study of the outcomes of such systems under various acceptability semantics, namely naive, stable, semi-stable, preferred, grounded and ideal. It starts by extending the existing list of rationality postulates that any rule-based system should satisfy. Then, it defines the key notion of option of a theory (a theory being a set of facts, a set of strict rules and a set of defeasible rules). For each of the cited semantics, it characterizes the extensions of a rule-based system that satisfies all the postulates in terms of options of the theory under which the system is built. It also fully characterizes the set of plausible conclusions of the system. The results show that designing a rule-based argumentation system requires great care.
Introduction
Argumentation is a promising approach for reasoning about inconsistent information. It consists of generating arguments that support claims, defining attacks between them, evaluating B Leila Amgoud amgoud@irit.fr Philippe Besnard besnard@irit.fr 1 CNRS -IRIT, 118, route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse, France the arguments using a given semantics and finally identifying the plausible claims on the basis of the strength of their arguments.
Dung proposed in [1] various semantics at an abstract level, i.e., without taking into account the structure of arguments or the nature of attacks. His abstract framework was instantiated by several scholars. The idea is as follows: Start with a knowledge base whose elements are encoded in a logical language, generate arguments using the consequence operator attached to the language, identify the attacks and apply Dung's semantics for the evaluation task. There were two major categories of instantiations for this abstract framework. The first category uses deductive logics (such as propositional logic [2, 3] or any Tarskian logic [4] ), whereas the second category uses rule-based languages. These languages distinguish between:
• facts which are information about particular instances like "My laptop is heavy."
• strict rules which encode general laws about classes of instances like "First generation laptops are heavy." Such rules do not have exceptions.
• defeasible rules which describe general behavior with exceptional cases. Defeasible rules correspond thus to what is called defaults in [5] or conditional assertions in [6, 7] .
Examples of rule-based argumentation systems are: aspic [8] , its extended version aspic+ [9] , DeLP [10] and the systems developed in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Despite the popularity of these systems, the results they return have not been characterized yet, except the system discussed in [11] .
The following questions are thus still open:
• what are the underpinnings of the extensions under various semantics?
• do the semantics return different results as at the abstract level?
• what is the number of extensions a system may have?
• what are the plausible conclusions with such systems?
In this paper, we answer all the four questions in three steps: We start by defining a rule-based argumentation system over a knowledge base called theory (a set of facts, a set of strict rules and a set of defeasible rules). The system uses a notion of derivation schema for generating arguments from the theory. For the sake of generality, the attack relation is left unspecified. However, it has the property of being conflict-dependent, that is, it captures the inconsistency that may be present in the theory. It is worth mentioning that all existing attack relations (like rebuttal and assumption attack) are conflict-dependent. A notable exception is undercutting which aims at blocking the application of defeasible rules [16] .
In a second step, we extend the list of postulates (consistency, closure under strict rules) proposed in [17] . The aim of those postulates is to mathematically capture what humans perceive as rationale behavior from the semantics of defeasible theories. They are thus desirable properties that a system should satisfy. We introduce three new postulates. The first one, strict precedence, ensures that any claim that follows from the strict part of a theory is a plausible conclusion of the argumentation system. The second postulate, exhaustiveness, ensures a form of completeness of the extensions of an argumentation system. The third postulate, closure under sub-arguments, states that an argument cannot be accepted if one of its sub-parts is questionable.
Finally, we investigate the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy all the postulates. We show that naive extensions return options of the theory (an option being a sub-theory that gathers a maximal-up to consistency-set of the facts, strict rules, and defeasible rules). Furthermore, the set of plausible conclusions under the naive semantics contains all the conclusions that are drawn from all the options. Stable extensions return preferred options but not necessarily all of them; it depends on the attack relation at work. Unlike options, preferred options are options that contain the strict part. Should not all preferred
• E is a preferred extension iff E is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) complete extension.
• E is a stable extension iff E attacks any argument in A\E.
• E is a semi-stable extension iff E is a complete extension and the union of the set E and the set of all arguments attacked by E is maximal (w.r.t. ⊆).
• E is a grounded extension iff E is a minimal (w.r.t. ⊆) complete extension.
• E is an ideal extension iff E is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) admissible set contained in every preferred extension.
An argumentation framework has a single grounded (respectively ideal) extension. However, it may have several naive, admissible, complete, preferred, stable and semi-stable extensions. It may also have zero stable extensions. R) be an argumentation framework. We denote by Ext x (H) the set of all extensions of H under semantics x ∈ {n, p, s, ss}, where n (respectively p, s, ss) stands for naive (respectively preferred, stable and semi-stable). We denote by GE(H) (respectively IE(H)) the single grounded (respectively ideal) extension of H. When we do not need to refer to a particular semantics, we write Ext(H) for short.
Notations Let H = (A,
The following result recalls some key properties of these semantics.
Property 1 [1, 18, 19] Let H = (A, R) be an argumentation framework.
• Ext s (H) ⊆ Ext n (H) • Ext s (H) ⊆ Ext p (H) • If |Ext s (H)| > 0, then Ext s (H) = Ext ss (H) • H has one grounded (respectively ideal) extension • GE(H) ⊆ IE(H)
When Ext s (H) = Ext p (H), the framework H is said to be coherent. It is also worth recalling that an argumentation framework that has an infinite set of arguments may have an infinite number of extensions (under multiple-extensions semantics). Let us now illustrate the different semantics on the argumentation framework H 1 depicted below.
H 1 has one stable/semi-stable extension E 3 and two preferred extensions: E 3 and E 6 = {a, g}.
Its grounded and ideal extensions are empty (GE(H 1 ) = IE(H 1 ) = ∅).
Consider now the following argumentation framework H 2 borrowed from [19] . It lays bare some differences between ideal and grounded semantics. a b c d
It can be checked that:
• GE(H 2 ) = ∅, • Ext p (H 2 ) = {{b, c}, {b, d}}, and • IE(H 2 ) = {b}.
Throughout the paper, we will refer to the seven semantics of Definition 3 by the reviewed semantics, and by extension-based semantics to any semantics, which partitions the power set of the set of arguments into two parts: extensions and non-extensions. Note that there are other semantics in the literature like recursive [20] and stage [21] that follow this line of research. This distinction is important since some of the results in the next sections hold for any extension-based semantics, while others hold under the reviewed ones.
Rule-based logical language
In what follows, L is a set of literals, i.e., atoms or negation of atoms. The negation of an atom x from L is denoted ¬x. We consider two additional constants and σ such that / ∈ L and σ / ∈ L. Three kinds of information are distinguished:
• Facts, which are elements of L ∪ { } • Strict rules, which are of the form x 1 , . . . , x n → x (x, x 1 , . . . , x n denoting literals in L) • Defeasible rules, which are of the form x 1 , . . . , x n ⇒ x or of the form ⇒ x (x, x 1 , . . . , x n denoting literals in L) Facts are information about particular instances. A strict rule expresses general information that has no exception. It is read as follows: If x 1 , . . . , x n hold, then x always holds. A defeasible rule of the form x 1 , . . . , x n ⇒ x expresses general information that may have exceptions and is read as follows: If x 1 , . . . , x n hold, then generally x holds as well. A defeasible rule of the form ⇒ x expresses that x is a defeasible fact and is read as follows: generally x holds. Unlike existing systems like ASPIC [8] where a strict rule with an empty body represents a fact, in our formalism we keep general information and factual information separate.
Let L be a set of atoms used for naming rules with the constraints L ∩ L = ∅, / ∈ L and σ / ∈ L . Every rule has a unique name and two rules cannot have the same name. Throughout the paper, rules are named r, r 1 , r 2 , . . . S, D) where F = { } ∪ X , with X ⊆ L, is a set of facts, and S ⊆ L (respectively D ⊆ L ) is a set of strict (respectively defeasible) rules' names. T is finite iff all three sets F , S and D are finite.
Definition 4 (Theory) A theory is a triple T = (F,
Note that is a fact in any theory. Note also that the two sets S and D contain names of rules and not the corresponding rules themselves. Throughout the paper, (F, S, ∅) is referred to as the strict part of a theory T = (F, S, D) .
Notations
Let r ∈ L , the function Rule(r ) returns the (strict or defeasible) rule whose name is r . For each rule x 1 , . . . , x n → x (respectively x 1 , . . . , x n ⇒ x or ⇒ x) whose name is r , the head of the rule is Head(r ) = x and the body of the rule is Body(r ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n } or Body(r ) = { }. Let T = (F, S, D) and T = (F , S , D ) be two theories. We say that T is a sub-theory of T , written T T , iff F ⊆ F and S ⊆ S and D ⊆ D . The relation is the strict version of (i.e., it is the case that at least one of the three inclusions is strict).
The notion of consistency is defined as follows:
This simple definition of consistency is sufficient since the language L contains only literals. However, it is not suitable in case of richer languages. Assume that L is a propositional language. Thus, the set {x, y, ¬x ∨¬y} is consistent with respect to the above definition while it is clearly not the case. Thus, richer languages require a stronger definition of consistency like the one proposed in [22] .
Without loss of generality, throughout the paper we make the three following assumptions about rules.
Assumptions
The body of every (strict/defeasible) rule is finite and not empty. Moreover, for each rule r , Body(r )∪{Head(r )} is consistent. We say that r is consistent.
Note that the fact that rules are consistent does not ensure the consistency of a set of rules. [23] discussed different forms of rule consistency. One of them is illustrated by the example {x ⇒ y, y ⇒ ¬x} where both defeasible rules are consistent whereas together lead to an inconsistent rule x ⇒ ¬x.
Let us now show how new information (i.e., literal) is produced from a given theory. This is generally the case when (strict and/or defeasible) rules are fired in a derivation schema. Below we provide a definition which generalizes derivations as defined by [10, 24] and others. r 1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) such that:
In order to improve readability, we somehow abuse the notation: we use the rules themselves instead of their names.
Example 1 Consider the theory T 1 such that F 1 , S 1 , D 1 are as follows.
Each of (1)- (7) below is a derivation schema from theory T 1
A derivation schema is not necessarily consistent (such as (7) above), as it may contain opposite literals in the form x i = ¬x j for some i and j. (A derivation d is consistent iff Seq(d) is consistent.) Moreover, a derivation schema is not necessarily minimal (for set inclusion) as shown in Example 1: compare (3) with (4). The former is a proper sub-sequence of the latter. Let T be a theory and x ∈ L. A derivation schema for x from T is minimal iff none of its proper subsequences is a derivation schema for x from T .
Definition 7 (Minimal derivation schema)
Interestingly enough, there are two ways for a derivation schema not to be minimal for set inclusion: (i) involving superfluous literals, i.e., literals that do not serve toward inferring the conclusion as is illustrated by (5) in Example 1 (q is of no use there), (ii) involving redundancy (hence, repeated literals) as illustrated by (4) in Example 1 ( p is repeated twice). r 1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) for x from T is focused iff it can be reduced to a minimal one by just deleting repeated pairs (x i , r i ). Notations For a theory T , CN(T ) denotes the set of all literals that have a derivation schema from T . We call CN(T ) the potential consequences drawn from T (for short, consequences) but they need not be definitive as they may happen to be dismissed by opposite conclusions.
Property 2 Let
The following property applies to the consequences drawn from a given theory.
Property 3 Let T = (F, S, D) be a theory.
•
Some rules may not be activated (i.e., the literals in their body have no derivation schema). Let us consider the following example.
There are rules here whose head is not a consequence of T 2 . In symbols, CN(
Namely, the two rules r 2 and r 4 are not activated.
It is also easy to show that CN is monotonic. Note that a similar result was shown in [25] for the logic underlying the ASPIC system [8] .
Property 4 Let T and T be two theories. If T T then CN(T ) ⊆ CN(T ).
Let us now introduce the key notion of option which is useful for characterizing the extensions of argumentation systems under various semantics. An option is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent sub-theory of a given theory.
Opt(T ) denotes the set of all options of T .
Let us illustrate this new notion by the following example.
Example 3 Consider T 3 such that F 3 , S 3 , D 3 are as follows.
The theory T 3 has seven options:
A theory has at least one option which is the theory itself in case it is consistent. This is the case in Example 2: Opt(T 2 ) = {T 2 }.
Property 5 Let T = (F, S, D) be a theory.
We show next that options are all pairwise distinct.
Proposition 1 For all
The definition of option does not make any difference between the strict part of a theory (i.e., its facts and strict rules) and its defeasible part. In rule systems [24] , the former takes precedence over the latter since it represents the "certain" information of a theory. For instance, in default logic the certain part belongs to every extension of a theory [5] . This precedence is captured by the following notion of preferred option. Unlike options, the defeasible rules of a theory do not necessarily belong to at least one preferred option of the theory as shown by the following example.
Example 4 The theory T 4 such that
has a single preferred option O = (F 4 , S 4 , ∅) which does not contain the unique defeasible rule r 2 .
Every preferred option is an option. The converse holds only when the theory is consistent in which case the latter is the only (preferred) option (cf. Property 5).
Property 6 Let
A theory may not have preferred options. This is in particular the case when the strict part (the set of facts and strict rules) is inconsistent.
Property 7 Let
Notice that the set of consequences of an (preferred) option is not necessarily maximal for set inclusion as shown by Example 3.
Notations For a set B of theories, we denote the set of its maximal elements as Let us now introduce the concept of free part of a theory T = (F, S, D) . It is the subtheory that is made of the set of facts, the set of strict rules and the defeasible rules which are involved in every preferred option of T .
Definition 11 (Free sub-theory)
The free sub-theory of a theory T = (F, S, D) is
The following result summarizes some basic properties of this sub-theory.
Property 8 Let T be a theory.
• For any O 
Rule-based argumentation systems
In this section, we propose an instantiation of Dung's framework that allows reasoning about defeasible information, i.e., drawing conclusions from a theory T = (F, S, D) . The instantiation is referred to as argumentation system keeping thus the term framework for the abstract formalism of Dung. The backbone of an argumentation system is naturally the notion of argument. Intuitively, an argument is a justification of a claim, i.e., it provides evidence that the claim is true. Thus, it should satisfy at least the three following basic properties: (i) internal coherence, (ii) relevance to the claim it justifies and (iii) truth preserving (i.e., it guarantees the truth of the claim). It is true that humans' arguments may be inconsistent, but they are seen as fallacious by reasonable people. Furthermore, the topic of the paper is not reasoning about humans' arguments. It is rather reasoning about inconsistent theories by using arguments as a building block of the proposed logic.
Example 1 (Cont) Below are the nine arguments that are built from the theory T 1 .
• 
The following result shows that an argument provides a minimal derivation schema for a conclusion. r 1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) from T , the following two statements are equivalent:
Theorem 1 Let T be a theory. For any consistent sequence d
An argument may have several sub-parts, each of which may give birth to an argument, called sub-argument of the original argument.
Notations The function Sub(.) returns the set of all sub-arguments of a given argument.
Example 1 (Cont)
The argument ( (q, σ ), (¬s, r 2 ) , ¬s) has two sub-arguments: ( (q, σ ) , q) and itself. By contrast, ( (q, σ ) , q) is not a sub-argument of ( ( p, σ ), (q, r 6 ) , q).
The converse is not true as shown next.
Example 5 Consider the two arguments a and b:
Argumentation systems that use a Tarskian logic such as propositional logic may have infinite sets of arguments even when the theories (called knowledge bases) over which they are built are themselves finite (cf. [26] ). We show that this is not the case for rule-based argumentation systems. Indeed, the sets of arguments are finite as soon as the theories are finite.
Proposition 2 If a theory T is finite, then Arg(T ) is finite.
The set of arguments built from a given theory cannot be empty since the set of facts of a theory contains at least .
Property 10 For a theory
The construction of arguments in all existing structured argumentation systems is a monotonic process. By structured systems, we mean argumentation systems that build their arguments from knowledge bases encoded in particular logics. These include ASPIC [8] , ASPIC+ [9] , DeLP [10] , ABA [27] and those discussed in [4] . Thus, unlike Dung's framework where arguments are abstract entities, in structured systems arguments have a clear origin and a precise structure. Hunter studied in [25] the properties of the logics underlying existing structured systems. The results show that the set of arguments built from a knowledge base cannot be shrunk when the base is extended by new information. The following result shows that this property holds also for the kind of logic discussed in this paper.
Proposition 3 Let T and T be two theories. If
A rule-based instantiation of Dung's abstract framework is defined as follows: R) where Arg(T ) is the set of arguments built from T in the sense of Definition 12 and
For the sake of generality, the attack relation of an argumentation system is left unspecified in the sequel. Thus, it may be instantiated in different ways. In existing rule-based argumentation systems like the ASPIC system as defined in [8, 17] and its extended version ASPIC+ [9] , three kinds of attack relations are used: (i) rebut, initially proposed in [28] , which requires that two arguments have opposite conclusions, (ii) assumption attack, proposed also in [28] , according to which an argument undermines a premise of another argument, and (iii) undercut, proposed in [16] , which allows an argument to prevent the application of a defeasible rule in another argument. The two first relations are conflict-dependent, i.e., they capture the inconsistency of the theory over which an argumentation system is built. Such relations should show no attack from argument a to b unless their derivation schemas contain opposite literals.
An important feature of conflict-dependent attack relations is that they do not admit selfattacking arguments, mainly since arguments are consistent.
Proposition 4 Let
Conflict-dependency is somehow related to the notion of conflict-freeness of sets of arguments. Indeed, when the attack relation is conflict-dependent, the set of arguments built from any consistent theory is conflict-free with respect to this relation. (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T . For every T T 
Proposition 5 Let
Another feature of all the attack relations in existing rule-based argumentation systems is the fact that they privilege strict arguments. (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T . An attack relation R privileges strict arguments iff for all
A consequence of this property is that the set Arg(Free(T )) is admissible (i.e., it is conflict-free and defends all its elements). We will show in a subsequent section that this result is crucial for characterizing ideal extension. (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T Unless stated otherwise, in what follows we do not make any assumption about the attack relation of a rule-based argumentation system. However, the arguments of the latter are evaluated using any of the semantics recalled in Definition 3. The extensions of a system are used for defining the plausible conclusions to be drawn from the theory over which the system is built. A literal is a plausible conclusion of a system iff it is a common conclusion to all the extensions. (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T . The set of plausible conclusions of H under semantics x is
Theorem 2 Let
The set of plausible conclusions coincides with the set of common conclusions of the extensions, of course when extensions exist.
Property 11
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that Ext x (H) = ∅ where x is any of the reviewed semantics. The equality Output(H) =
Finally, it is obvious that the plausible conclusions of an argumentation system are consequences of the theory over which it is built.
Property 12 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T . The inclusion Output(H) ⊆ CN(T ) holds under any extension-based semantics.
It is worth noticing that under admissible semantics, the set of plausible conclusions of any argumentation system is empty. This is mainly due to the fact that the empty set is always an admissible extension. This makes this semantics unsuitable for defeasible reasoning. Complete semantics suffers from the same problem. Indeed, since under this semantics extensions are not maximal for set inclusion, the empty set may be an extension leading thus to an empty set of plausible conclusions. Stable semantics may also be unsuitable for argumentation systems that do not have extensions. However, we show in a subsequent section that rule-based systems that satisfy some desirable properties do have stable extensions, in particular when the attack relation is conflict-dependent.
Postulates for rule-based argumentation systems
Like any reasoning model, argumentation systems should enjoy some desirable properties or rationality postulates that ensure their soundness. The first work on postulates in argumentation was done by [17] in the context of rule-based systems. Starting from the observation that some existing systems like those proposed in [12, 29] suffer from two main problems: (i) returning inconsistent sets of plausible conclusions and (ii) forgetting intuitive conclusions, the authors proposed three postulates which prevent the encountered problems. In what follows, we recall the three postulates and propose three new ones. The first postulate proposed in [17] concerns the consistency of the set of conclusions supported by every extension.
Postulate 1 (Consistency) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a theory T = (F, S, D) satisfies consistency under semantics x iff for any
A rule-based system which satisfies this postulate has necessarily a consistent set of plausible conclusions.
Property 13 [17] If an argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) satisfies consistency under semantics x (x being any extension-based semantics), then Output(H) is consistent.
The second postulate ensures a form of "completeness" of the outputs of an argumentation system. It says that if there is an argument with conclusion x in an extension of the system, and there exists a strict rule x → y in the theory over which the system is built, then y should also be supported by an argument in the same extension. Recall that a strict rule has no exception. Thus, as soon as x is true, y holds for sure.
Postulate 2 (Closure under strict rules) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a theory T = (F, S, D) is closed under strict rules under semantics x iff for any
If an argumentation system is closed under strict rules, then its set of plausible conclusions is also closed under strict rules.
Property 14 [17] Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D). If H is closed under strict rules under semantics x (x being any extensionbased semantics), then Output(H) = CN((Output(H), S, ∅)).
A third postulate, called indirect consistency, was proposed in [17] . It ensures that every closed (under strict rules) extension should satisfy consistency. It was shown that a system that satisfies consistency and closure under strict rules satisfies this form of indirect consistency.
Property 15 [17] Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D). If H satisfies consistency and is closed under strict rules under semantics x (x being any extension-based semantics), then for any
It is worth mentioning that the three previous results hold for any attack relation and under any extension-based acceptability semantics, thus under any of the semantics recalled in Definition 3 and others like recursive semantics [20] .
In any axiomatic approach, the axioms (or postulates) should ideally all be independent from each other, i.e., none is deduced from the others. Thus, in the sequel indirect consistency is abandoned since it follows from Postulates 1 and 2. We propose next three new postulates which were already defined in [30] for argumentation systems that use a logic in the sense of [22] . The first one says that if an argument belongs to an extension, then all its sub-arguments should be in the extension. Thus, an argument cannot be accepted if one of its sub-parts is questionable. This is a natural requirement since plausible conclusions inferred from a theory rely on their supporting arguments which should be unassailable.
Postulate 3 (Closure under sub-arguments) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a theory T = (F, S, D) is closed under sub-arguments under semantics x iff for any
Argumentation systems that satisfy both consistency and closure under sub-arguments enjoy a strong version of consistency. Indeed, the set of consequences that follow from the theory of an extension is consistent.
Proposition 6 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext x (H) = ∅ (x being any extension-based semantics). If H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments, then for any
Let us illustrate this result with an example. R) under a given semantics. Clearly, CN((Concs(E), S, ∅)) = {y, z} is consistent. However, Th(E) = T and CN(T ) = {x, ¬x, y, z} is inconsistent. Proposition 6 ensures that the argumentation system (Arg (T 5 ) , R) violates at least one of the consistency or closure under sub-arguments postulates.
Since facts and strict rules are the certain part in a theory (facts being observable and strict rules having no exceptions), they should be plausible conclusions of any argumentation system. It is worth mentioning that this principle is applied, for instance, in default logic where the non-defeasible information of a default theory is part of all extensions [5] . Of course this makes sense when the non-defeasible information is consistent.
Postulate 4 (Strict precedence) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a theory T = (F, S, D) satisfies strict precedence under semantics x iff CN((F, S, ∅)) ⊆ Output(H).
Notice that argumentation systems that have no extensions violate this postulate. Similarly, systems that evaluate their arguments using a semantics which considers the empty set as an extension (like admissible semantics) violate strict precedence. Such systems are thus not suitable for defeasible reasoning since they may miss intuitive conclusions.
Proposition 7 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that ∅ ∈ Ext x (H). H violates strict precedence under semantics x.
We show next that if an argumentation system satisfies consistency and strict precedence, then the strict part of the theory over which it is built is consistent.
Proposition 8 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext x (H) = ∅. If H satisfies consistency and strict precedence under semantics x, then CN((F, S, ∅)) is consistent.
The last postulate ensures a form of completeness of the extensions of an argumentation system under any semantics. It says that if the sequence of an argument is part of the conclusions of a given extension, then the argument should belong to the extension. Informally: If each step in the argument is good enough to be in the extension, then so is the argument itself. It is worth pointing out that this postulates holds for both strict and defeasible rules.
Postulate 5 (Exhaustiveness) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a theory T = (F, S, D) satisfies exhaustiveness under semantics x iff for any
Argumentation systems that satisfy exhaustiveness and closure under sub-arguments have complete extensions, i.e., they are closed in terms of arguments.
Proposition 9 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system such that Ext x (H) = ∅ (x being any extension-based semantics). If H is closed under sub-arguments and satisfies exhaustiveness under semantics x, then for all
When an argumentation system satisfies strict precedence and exhaustiveness, then its strict arguments are part of any extension. This holds under any extension-based semantics.
Proposition 10 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies exhaustiveness and strict precedence, then for any
An axiomatic approach should obey an important feature: The postulates should be compatible, i.e., they can be satisfied all together by an argumentation system under a given semantics. Fortunately, this is the case of the five postulates discussed in this section.
Proposition 11 The five postulates are compatible.
The four postulates (consistency, closure under sub-arguments, closure under strict rules, strict precedence) are independent. None of them follows from a subset of the three others. However, as will be shown in the next section, exhaustiveness follows from consistency and closure under sub-arguments when an argumentation system uses a conflict-dependent attack relation and naive or stable semantics for evaluating arguments.
Outcomes of rule-based argumentation systems
This section analyzes the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems under the reviewed semantics, i.e., those recalled in Definition 3, that are suitable for defeasible reasoning. Recall that complete semantics is not a good candidate for such reasoning since its extensions are not maximal (for set inclusion) and may thus lead to an empty set of plausible conclusions, and missing intuitive conclusions. We analyze the extensions under each semantics. Indeed, we characterize the set Concs(.) of conclusions and the theory Th(.) of each extension. We also characterize the set Output(.) of plausible conclusions that are drawn by a rule-based argumentation system from a theory.
Note that the argumentation system described in Sect. 4 is not fully specified since its attack relation is left undefined and may thus be instantiated in different ways. For the purpose of our study, we do not need to consider a particular attack relation. Since any reasonable argumentation system should satisfy the discussed postulates, throughout this section we only focus on systems that satisfy the postulates. Such systems exist and ASPIC, defined in [17] , is one of them. Indeed, it was shown in [17] that ASPIC, which uses restricted rebut as attack relation, satisfies consistency and closure under both sub-arguments and strict rules under all Dung's semantics. Furthermore, the attack relation in ASPIC privileges strict arguments (by definition) and the strict part of a theory is assumed to be consistent. Thus, the system satisfies strict precedence under the same semantics. Finally, from our Proposition 15 (respectively Proposition 13), it follows that it also satisfies exhaustiveness under stable (respectively naive) semantics. The results we provide next hold for any instantiation of the attack relation R. This means that whatever the attack relation that is considered, the outcome will be the same. This shows also that all the reasonable rule-based argumentation systems that can be built over the same theory are equivalent [31, 32] , in the sense they provide the same extensions and the set of plausible conclusions under a given semantics.
Before presenting the formal results concerning the reviewed semantics, below are some results that hold under any extension-based semantics, thus under all the reviewed semantics but also under several other semantics (e.g., recursive semantics [20] , the one used in DeLP system [10] , stage semantics [21] , …). The first result characterizes the set of conclusions of each extension of an argumentation system which is closed under sub-arguments.
Proposition 12 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H is closed under sub-arguments, then for any
The next result shows that if an argumentation system over a theory satisfies strict precedence, closure under both sub-arguments and strict rules, then the set of literals deduced from Th(E), the theory of an extension E, is exactly the same set that is obtained from Th(E) extended by all facts and strict rules which are not in Th(E).
Theorem 3 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies strict precedence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments, then for any
We also show that the theory of an extension can be extended into a sub-theory (of the argumentation system) which infers, using the notion of derivation, all the conclusions that are supported by arguments of the extension. This (i.e., Theorem 4) will be useful in proving various results in the next sections.
Theorem 4 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies strict precedence, and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments, then for any
E ∈ Ext(H), Concs(E) = CN(O) for O = (F, S, ζ ) such that ζ = ⎛ ⎝ (d,x)∈E Def(d) ⎞ ⎠ ∪ r | r ∈ D and Body(r ) CN(Th(E)) .
Naive semantics
Before characterizing the extensions as well as the plausible conclusions of a rule-based argumentation system, let us first show some additional links between the postulates in the particular case of naive semantics. The first result shows that exhaustiveness follows from consistency and closure under sub-arguments. This is the case when the attack relation is conflict-dependent. The second result shows that when an argumentation system is closed under sub-arguments and satisfies the consistency postulate under naive semantics, then every naive extension of the system is closed in terms of arguments.
Proposition 14 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under subarguments under naive semantics. For any
Strict precedence is problematic in case of naive semantics since it may be violated by a rule-based argumentation system. This is mainly due to the fact that the orientation of attacks is not taken into account when computing naive extensions; thus, there is no way to enforce the postulate. We show next that strict arguments are part of any naive extension only when they neither are attacked nor attack any argument.
Theorem 5 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
We have previously shown that the five postulates are compatible in the general case. Indeed, under stable and preferred semantics, it was shown that the ASPIC system satisfies all the postulates. In case of naive semantics, this is not always true. Strict precedence is not compatible with consistency when the strict part is inconsistent, or it is consistent but in conflict with the defeasible part. For instance, any argumentation system built over the theory of Example 3 will violate at least one of the two postulates under naive semantics.
Theorem 6 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
and Conc(a) = ¬Conc(b), then H cannot satisfy both strict precedence and consistency under naive semantics.
In case of the ASPIC system, the argument b cannot be strict since the strict part (i.e., CN(F, S, ∅)) is assumed to be consistent. Moreover, there is only one conflict between a and b and which emanates from a since strict arguments cannot be attacked by defeasible ones. Thus, strict precedence is violated.
We show next that, assuming consistency and closure under sub-arguments, naive extensions are maximal. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T 
Theorem 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),
The following theorem characterizes naive extensions. It says that every naive extension of an argumentation system which satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments has a unique corresponding maximal option in the theory at hand.
Theorem 8 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under subarguments under naive semantics. For any E ∈ Ext n (H), there exists a unique option
Note that the inclusion Th(E) ⊆ O is due to the fact that a theory Th(E) of an extension E contains only activated (strict and defeasible) rules, while maximal options may contain non-activated ones. Thus, the elements which in O but not in Th(E) are non-activated rules.
We prove that no two naive extensions return the same option. Moreover, every extension is exactly the set of all arguments that can be built from its corresponding option.
Theorem 9 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments under naive semantics.
We have shown that each naive extension captures exactly one maximal option and it supports all, and only, the consequences of that option. Theorem 10 states that every maximal option has a corresponding naive extension. So, there is a bijection from the set of naive extensions to the set of maximal options. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments under naive semantics. 
Theorem 10 Let H = (Arg(T ),
From the previous results, it follows that there is a bijection between the set of naive extensions of an argumentation system and the maximal options of the theory over which the system is built. 
Corollary 1 Let

T )).
The previous results require only the satisfaction of two postulates: consistency and closure under sub-arguments. We show next that when a rule-based argumentation system satisfies all the five postulates, there is a bijection between the set of naive extensions of the system and the maximal preferred options of the theory over which it is built. The reason is that in such a case, the maximal options of the theory coincide with the maximal preferred ones. Recall that in general, maximal preferred options may be different from maximal options.
Theorem 11
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T 
T )).
It is possible to delimit the number of naive extensions of any argumentation system that satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments. It is exactly the number of maximal options of the theory at hand. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments under naive semantics. The equality |Ext n (H)| = |Max(Opt(T ))| holds.
Corollary 3 Let H = (Arg(T ),
It follows also that when a theory is finite, then any system built over it has a finite number of naive extensions. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T What about the plausible conclusions that are drawn from a theory using an argumentation system that satisfies the postulates? From the previous results, it is easy to show that they are the literals that follow from all the maximal options. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments under naive semantics.
Corollary 4 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Theorem 12 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Example 3 (Cont) Any argumentation system H that can be built over the theory T 3 and has a conflict-dependent attack relation and satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments will have as output the set Output(
Let us summarize the main results: under naive semantics, any rule-based argumentation system may violate strict precedence. However, the other postulates can be satisfied. In such a case , if the attack relation is conflict-dependent, then any argumentation system will infer exactly the literals that follow from all the maximal options of the theory over which the system is built. This is due to the bijection that holds between the set of naive extensions and the set of maximal options. In case the system satisfies also strict precedence and closure under strict rules, then the maximal options of the theory coincide with the maximal preferred options.
Stable semantics
As for naive semantics, exhaustiveness follows from consistency and closure under subarguments in case of stable semantics. • H satisfies exhaustiveness under stable semantics.
Proposition 15 Let
Stable extensions of rule-based argumentation systems satisfying the five postulates return maximal preferred options. This means that if one instantiates Dung's framework and does not get maximal preferred options with stable extensions, then the instantiation certainly violates at least one of the postulates. Note that strict precedence may be satisfied by an argumentation system under stable semantics while it is violated by the same system under naive semantics. This is due to the fact that the orientation of attacks plays an important role in stable semantics, then strict precedence can be enforced by choosing an appropriate orientation. R) 
Theorem 13 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Two stable extensions cannot capture the same maximal preferred option. 
Theorem 14 Let
The previous results characterize the stable extensions of rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy the postulates. However, they do not guarantee that each maximal preferred option of a theory has a corresponding stable extension. To put it differently, it does not guarantee a bijection between the sets Ext s (H) and Max(POpt(T )) and thus does not ensure the equality |Ext s (H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|. In case of argumentation systems that use a Tarskian logic for representing information and for computing arguments, it was shown in [4] that this equality depends on the attack relation that is chosen. We show next that this is also the case for rule-based systems.
Given T , let s be the set of all attack relations that are conflict-dependent and that ensure the five postulates under stable semantics: (T ) , R) 
Let us analyze separately each category of attack relations. The following result shows that the set s 1 is empty, meaning that there is no attack relation which prevents the existence of stable extensions. To say it differently, any argumentation system which satisfies the postulates has at least one stable extension.
Theorem 15 s 1 = ∅.
A consequence of this postulate is that stable extensions coincide with semi-stable ones. Indeed, it was shown in [18] that when stable extensions exist, they coincide with semi-stable extensions.
Corollary 5 For all argumentation system
From the previous results, it is possible to delimit the number of stable extensions of rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy the five postulates. R) be an argumentation system defined over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies the five postulates, then
Corollary 6 Let H = (Arg(T ),
It follows that when a theory is finite, any argumentation system built over it has a finite number of stable extensions. R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T Attack relations of category s 2 induce a bijection between the set of stable extensions of an argumentation system and the set of maximal preferred options of the theory over which the system is built. Indeed, every preferred option gives a stable extension. R) be an argumentation system over a theory T Argumentation systems with an attack relation from s 2 are coherent, meaning that the preferred extensions exhaust all the stable ones. It follows thus that the three semantics (semistable, stable, preferred) coincide. This means that semi-stable and preferred semantics have no added value with respect to stable semantics since they guarantee the same results.
Corollary 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Theorem 16 Let H = (Arg(T ),
such that R ∈ s 2 . For any O ∈ Max(POpt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Ext s (H).
Theorem 17 For any argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) such that R ∈ s 2 , it holds Ext s (H) = Ext ss (H) = Ext p (H).
In case an argumentation system satisfies strict precedence under naive semantics (see Theorem 5) , then its extensions coincide with the stable ones. To put differently, in case naive semantics can guarantee strict precedence, stable semantics becomes useless since it provides no added value with respect to naive semantics.
Theorem 18 For all argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) such that R ∈ s 2 , if H satisfies the postulates under naive semantics, then Ext n (H) = Ext s (H) = Ext ss (H) = Ext p (H).
Plausible conclusions of rule-based argumentation systems that use attack relations in category s2 are exactly the literals that follow from all the maximal preferred options of the theory at hand.
Theorem 19 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
T such that R ∈ s 2 . Output(H) = O i ∈ Max(POpt(T ))
CN(O i ).
Systems that use relations in s 3 choose a proper subset of the maximal preferred options of T and make inferences from them. Their output sets are as follows:
Theorem 20 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
These attack relations introduce a critical discrimination between the maximal preferred options of a theory. Hence, great care must be exercised when designing rule-based argumentation systems based on stable semantics: The principles governing the interaction between ⇒ and R must be both rigorously and meticulously specified so as to avoid trouble of which the following example is an easy case.
Example 7 Consider T 6 such that F 6 , S 6 , D 6 are as follows:
The theory T 6 has two maximal preferred options:
For a system H whose attack relation is in s 3 either (i) Arg(O 1 ) or (ii) Arg(O 2 ) is its unique stable extension. In case (i), s ∈ Output(H) and ¬s / ∈ Output(H). In case (ii), ¬s is the plausible conclusion. By the obvious symmetry (don't be misled by negation! 1 ), either choice would be arbitrary, and this is an instance where an attack relation from s 2 is alright.
To sum up, attack relations satisfying the postulates can be split into two categories: s 2 and s 3 . Relations from s 2 make semi-stable semantics and preferred semantics to collapse into stable semantics. They offer no added value with respect to the latter. Stable semantics may, however, be more valuable than naive semantics. Indeed, the theories for which strict precedence cannot be satisfied under naive semantics are handled correctly under stable semantics. This latter can enforce the satisfaction of strict precedence if the attack relation is defined in an appropriate way. For those theories where the postulate is satisfied, stable semantics collapses into naive semantics. With attack relations from category s 3 , pitfalls threaten as preferred options are discarded, and a lot of care must be exercised when designing such an argumentation system.
Preferred semantics
Preferred semantics was originally proposed in order to overcome the limitation of stable semantics which does not guarantee the existence of extensions. Indeed, any argumentation system has at least one preferred extension which may be empty. We show that in case of rule-based systems the empty set cannot be an extension.
Theorem 21 Let H be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that H satisfies the strict precedence postulate under preferred semantics. Ext p (H) = {∅}.
Unlike the cases of naive and stable extensions, a preferred extension may capture a proper sub-part of a maximal preferred option. For instance, it is not impossible that a preferred extension captures only the strict part of theory T 6 in Example 7.
Theorem 22 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics. For any E ∈ Ext p (H), ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Th(E) O and Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O).
Each preferred extension corresponds to exactly one maximal preferred option. It either returns all the consequences of that option, or chooses a subset. The latter contains all the conclusions that follow from the strict part and some conclusions that follow using defeasible rules. We show next that there is at least one maximal preferred option which is captured by a preferred extension. This is mainly due to the fact that stable extensions exist. We show next that the free part of a theory, i.e., the sub-theory, which consists of the set of facts, the set of strict rules and the defeasible rules which are involved in every preferred option, is part of any preferred extension of argumentation systems that satisfy the postulates. Indeed, the set Arg(Free(T )) is part of every preferred extension of any argumentation system which satisfies consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under subarguments.
Theorem 23 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics. There exists O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Arg(O) ∈ Ext p (H).
Example 7 (Cont)
Theorem 25 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that R is conflict-dependent and privileges strict arguments (recall Definition 16), and H satisfies consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under sub-arguments under preferred semantics.
Arg(Free(T )) ⊆
From the previous results, it follows that the number of preferred extensions does not exceed the number of maximal preferred options of the theory over which the system is built.
Theorem 26 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics.
≤ |Ext p (H)| ≤ |Max(POpt(T ))|
When a theory is finite, any argumentation system built over it has a finite number of preferred extensions.
Corollary 8 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics. If T is finite, then H has a finite number of preferred extensions.
Let us now characterize the plausible conclusions that are drawn from a theory T by an argumentation system H satisfying the rationality postulates under preferred semantics. Let p be the set of all attack relations that ensure the postulates under preferred semantics: (T ) , R) satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics}.
In his seminal paper [1] , Dung has shown that the stable extensions of an argumentation system are also preferred extensions of the system. Consequently, the set p is a subset of s . 
Property
Corollary 9 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory T such that
In the case of attack relations of category p 2 , Arg(Free(T )) is equal to the intersection of all preferred extensions. R) be an argumentation system over a theory T 
Theorem 27 Let H = (Arg(T ),
where x ∈ {p, s, ss}.
The output of an argumentation system is in this case the same as under stable semantics, i.e., the plausible conclusions given in Theorem 19. Let us now analyze attack relations of category p 3 . Remember that in this case stable semantics chooses only some maximal preferred options of the theory at hand. Four situations may be encountered:
1. The stable extensions and the preferred extensions of an argumentation system coincide.
Thus, preferred semantics has no added value with respect to stable semantics. Moreover, it may lead to arbitrary results as discussed in the previous subsection when R ∈ s 3 (see Example 7 where one of the defeasible rules is chosen in an arbitrary way). 2. The preferred extensions consider additional but not all maximal preferred options (other than the ones chosen by stable semantics). This case is similar to the previous one, and the argumentation system may return arbitrary results. Note that Example 7 is not sufficient to show this case since stable semantics will return one of O 1 and O 2 while preferred semantics will return the second one, which corresponds more to the case above. In order to exemplify this case, consider the following theory T 7 .
Example 8 Consider T 7 such that F 7 , S 7 , D 7 are as follows:
The theory T 7 has three maximal preferred options: 19) . Indeed, the argumentation system returns all the conclusions that follow from all maximal preferred options of the theory. Note that this output is also ensured by stable semantics when R ∈ s2 . 4. Some of the preferred extensions provide proper sub-parts of maximal preferred options.
In this case, the result of the argumentation system may be arbitrary as can be seen on the following example.
Example 8 (Cont)
Consider an argumentation system H = (Arg(T 7 ) , R) such that R ∈ p 3 . Assume that H has two preferred extensions: E 1 and E 2 . From Theorem 23, one of them captures necessarily a maximal preferred option. Let E 1 be such extension, and let Option(E 1 ) = O 1 . Case 4 suggests that there is at least another preferred extension, say 3) . Assume that i = 2 and Th(E 2 ) = (F 7 , S 7 , {r 3 }).
Note that since preferred extensions are maximal for set inclusion, it cannot be the case that Th(E 2 ) = (F 7 , S 7 , {r 1 }) (since E 2 would be a subset of E 1 ). One can notice that among the four rules, r 4 is not used, which is unjustified.
To sum up, attack relations of category p 3 may lead either to arbitrary results or to results which can be provided by stable semantics.
Grounded: ideal semantics
This section analyzes the outcomes of rule-based systems under grounded and ideal semantics. Recall that both semantics ensure only one extension, which may be empty, for an argumentation system. Moreover, the grounded extension GE(H) of an argumentation system H is a sub-part of the ideal extension IE(H) of the same system. Consequently, the conclusions supported by the former are also supported by the latter, i.e., Concs(GE(H)) ⊆ Concs(IE(H)). Note also that the output set of an argumentation system is exactly Concs(GE(H)) (respectively Concs(IE(H))) in case of grounded (respectively ideal) semantics. Before presenting the formal results, it is worth mentioning that an argumentation system that satisfies the postulates under preferred semantics does not necessarily satisfy the postulates under grounded/ideal semantics. Similarly, a system that satisfies the postulates under ideal semantics may violate some of the postulates under grounded semantics. That is why in the following we study each semantics separately.
The ideal extension, introduced in [19] , is a maximal (for set inclusion) admissible set that is a subset of each preferred extension. In case of a rule-based argumentation system which satisfies the postulates, it returns a sub-part of one of the preferred options of the theory over which the system is built. Formally:
Theorem 28 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under ideal semantics, then there exists a preferred option O ∈ POpt(T ) such that Th(IE(H))
O and  CN((F, S, ∅) 
) ⊆ Concs(IE(H)) ⊆ CN(O).
Note that the outcome under ideal semantics may be arbitrary. This is in particular the case when the semantics selects one preferred option and draws all the conclusions that follow from this option. However, when the attack relation is of category p 2 and privileges strict arguments (recall Definition 16) , then the ideal extension is exactly the set Arg(Free(T )).
Theorem 29 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under ideal semantics and R ∈ p 2 and privileges strict arguments, then IE(H) = Arg(Free(T )).
The above result shows that ideal semantics allows the inference of literals only from the free part of a theory.
Corollary 10 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under ideal semantics and R ∈ p 2 and privileges strict arguments, then Output(H) = CN(Free(T )).
Note that in this case grounded extension may be more cautious than ideal one and may miss intuitive (free) conclusions since GE(H) ⊆ Arg(Free(T )).
The grounded extension of any argumentation system which satisfies the postulates under grounded semantics captures a sub-part of a preferred option, i.e., it behaves exactly like ideal extension.
Theorem 30 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under grounded semantics, then there exists a preferred option O ∈ POpt(T ) such that Th(GE(H))
O and CN((F, S, ∅)) ⊆ Concs(GE(H)) ⊆ CN(O).
Related work
The abstract argumentation framework proposed by Dung [1] was used for reasoning about defeasible information, and more generally for handling inconsistency. It was thus instantiated in different ways, considering different logical languages for representing information. Examples of such languages are propositional language (e.g., [2, 3] ) and rule-based ones (e.g., [8, 9, 11, 27, 29, 33] ).
All the instantiations are defined in a similar way: define arguments and attacks, then apply Dung's semantics on the defined graph, and infer the formulas that follow from all extensions. Some of these works are incomplete since there is one important step which is missing: characterizing the set of inferences that are drawn from a theory/knowledge base, i.e., describing formally how the output relates to the theory.
For filling this gap, in [4] , we considered argumentation systems that use Tarskian logics, covering thus the systems studied in [2, 3] . In [11, 33] , we focused on rule-based logics. Here we faced two issues: First, the logical languages that are considered in the literature are different. In ASPIC [8] , defeasible rules express defaults and any uncertain information. In ABA [27] , uncertain information is encoded by assumptions. In ASPIC+ [9] , several types of information are considered (axioms, ordinary premises, issues, assumptions, strict rules and defeasible rules). The differences between all these types are unclear, especially between strict rules and axioms (both represent certain and non-defeasible information), and between ordinary premises, assumptions and defeasible rules (which all represent uncertain and defeasible information). Consequently, we have chosen the logical language used in the ASPIC system [8, 17] . It considers facts and strict rules (for encoding strict information) and defeasible rules (for encoding assumptions, defeasible rules, ordinary premises). Another issue with rule-based argumentation systems is that there are two types of attack relations: inconsistency-based ones and undercut which amounts to blocking the application of defeasible rules. For a better understanding of each type of attack relation, we studied in [11] argumentation systems that use undercut as their sole attack relation, and in this paper we studied the impact of inconsistency-based ones.
Our formalism uses the same logical language as ASPIC and a more general inconsistencybased attack relation. Our results apply thus to ASPIC when its undercut relation is empty. Note that our results and those from [11] should be combined for characterizing the outcomes of the ASPIC system when it uses the two kinds of relations. This is left for future work.
ASPIC+ uses a "richer" logical language since its aim was to unify all existing argumentation systems. It can thus be seen a union of several elementary systems: ABA for dealing with assumptions, ASPIC for dealing with strict/defeasible information, and the systems defined in [4] for dealing with Tarskian logics. In [4] , we have characterized this sub-class of ASPIC+. In this paper, we characterized the sub-class capturing ASPIC.
The last well-known argumentation system, called ABA, cannot be compared to our formalism since the two systems use different logical languages. While ABA uses assumptions for capturing the defeasible information in a theory, our formalism uses defeasible rules.
Conclusion
The paper provides the first investigation on the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems that use inconsistency-based attack relations. The study is general in the sense that it keeps the attack relation unspecified. Thus, the system can be instantiated with any of the attack relations that are used in existing systems. The results show that under naive semantics, the systems return the literals that follow from all the options of the theory at hand. Stable and preferred semantics either do not provide an added value with respect to naive semantics or the attack relation of a system should be formalized in a very rigorous way in order to avoid arbitrary results. Ideal semantics returns the free part of a theory, whereas the grounded semantics returns a sub-part of the free part meaning that it may miss interesting conclusions.
(−→) Let us assume that there exist x i and x j such that x i = x j but i = j. Clearly, we can further assume i < j without loss of generality. Therefore, (x 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (x j−1 , r j−1 ),  (x j+1 , r j+1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) is also a derivation schema, but it is a proper subsequence of d, a contradiction arises. Now, let us assume that d fails to be focused. There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that x i / ∈ Body(r j ) for every j > i. Consequently,  (x 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (x i−1 , r i−1 ), (x i+1 , r i+1 ), . . . , (x n , r n ) is also a derivation schema for x in T , contradicting the minimality of d.
(←−) Let us assume that d fails to be minimal although d is focussed and the literals x 1 , . . . , x n are pairwise distinct. As d is not minimal, there exists a proper subsequence d of d which is a derivation schema for x in T . Let us write (x k+1 , r k+1 ), . . . , (x n , r n ) 
Proof of Property 3 Let T = (F, S, D) be a theory.
• The inclusions
From the first item, CN(T ) is finite.
• For any x ∈ F , the sequence (x, σ ) is a derivation schema for x from T . Thus, x ∈ CN(T ) and this proves the inclusion F ⊆ CN(T ).
• Assume that F = { } and r ∈ D such that Body(r ) = { }. Thus, since the body of any other rule in T is assumed to be non-empty, no rule in S ∪ D can be applied, hence
and r ∈ D such that Body(r ) = { } (since each such rule is applicable when it exists).
Proof of Property 4 Let
is also a derivation schema for x from T .
Proof of Property 5
The two properties follow trivially from the definition of option.
Proof of Property 6
The inclusion POpt(T ) ⊆ Opt(T ) follows trivially from Definitions 9 and 10.
Assume that
But, by assumption, the body of every defeasible rule is not empty. Thus, CN(C) = ∅. This contradicts the fact that CN(C) is inconsistent. T = (F, S, D) be a theory.
Proof of Property 7 Let
Assume that CN((F, S, ∅) ) is consistent. Thus, there exists a preferred option O such that either (i) for all r ∈ D , CN((F, S, {r }) ) is inconsistent meaning that O = CN((F, S, ∅) ) or (ii) there exists r ∈ D such that CN((F, S, {r }) ) is consistent thus (F, S, ∅) O. In both cases, POpt(T ) = ∅. Assume now that CN((F, S, ∅) ) is inconsistent. Since F and S should be part of any preferred option and the set of consequences of a preferred option should be consistent, then POpt(T ) = ∅.
Let r ∈ D and assume that CN((F, S, {r })) is consistent. From Definition 10, (F, S, {r }) is either a preferred option (iff for all r ∈ D such that r = r , CN((F, S, {r, r }) ) is inconsistent).
Or, there exists a preferred option
O = (F, S, {r } ∪ D ) where D ⊆ D\{r }.
Proof of Property 8 Let T = (F, S, D) be a theory and
Free(T ) = (F, S, D ). From the definition of Free(T ), Free(T ) O for all O ∈ POpt(T ). From Property 4, CN(Free(T )) ⊆ CN(O). Since CN(O) is consistent, then so is for CN(Free(T )).
Proof of Property 9 Let
There are two possibilities:
Proof of Property 10 Let T = (F, S, D) be a theory. Since ∈ F by Definition 4, ( , σ , ) ∈ Arg(T ) and thus Arg(T ) = ∅. R) be an argumentation system over a theory T and Ext(H) its set of extensions under any extension-based semantics. Assume that R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
Proof of Property 11 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Ext(H) = ∅. Let x ∈ Output(H). Thus, for all E ∈ Ext(H), ∃a ∈ E such that Conc(a) = x. It follows that x ∈ Concs(E i ), ∀E i ∈ Ext(H) and hence x ∈ E i ∈Ext(H) Concs(E i ). Assume now that x ∈ E i ∈Ext(H) Concs(E i ). Thus, ∀E i , ∃a i ∈ E i such that Conc(a i ) = x. Consequently, x ∈ Output(H).
Proof of Property 12 Let H = (Arg(T ),
T . Let x ∈ Output(H). From Definition 17, ∃(d, x) ∈ Arg(T ). From Definition 12, d is a derivation for x from T . Thus, x ∈ CN(T ).
Proof of Property 16
Let R ∈ p and let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be a rule-based argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) . Since H satisfies the five postulates, thus for all E ∈ Ext p (H), Ext p (H) , then for all E ∈ Ext s (H), E satisfies the above four properties. Thus, H satisfies consistency, exhaustiveness and closure under both subarguments and strict rules. Let us now show that it also satisfies strict precedence under stable semantics. From Property 11,
From Property 1, Ext s (H) ⊆
Since H satisfies strict precedence under preferred semantics, CN(F, S, ∅) ⊆ Concs(E). Thus, the property is satisfied by every stable extension.
Proof of Proposition 1 Let
For all x ∈ X , x ∈ CN(O) and thus x ∈ X . The same holds for all x ∈ X . Thus, X = X .
Let r ∈ Y ∪ Z . There are two cases:
Proof of Proposition 2 If T is finite, then CN(T ) is finite (apply Property 3). Consequently, Arg(T ) is finite.
Proof of Proposition 3 Let T and T be two theories such that
be an argument defined from T . All items in Definition 12 are independent from T except for d being a derivation schema for x from T . Hence, for (d, x) to be an argument defined from T , it is enough that d be a derivation schema for x from T . Now, this is equivalent to x ∈ CN(T ). By Property 4, the latter follows from x ∈ CN(T ) (which is itself proved from the fact that d is a derivation schema for x from T ). Thus, (d, x) is an argument defined from T .
Proof of Proposition 4 Let
This is impossible since a is an argument (thus Seq(d) should be consistent). R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that CN(T ) is consistent and R is conflict-dependent. Assume that
Proof of Proposition 5 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Arg(T ) is not conflict-free. Thus, there exist (d, x), (d , x ) ∈ Arg(T ) such that (d, x)R(d , x ). Consequently, Seq(d)∪Seq(d ) is inconsistent. Besides, from Property 3, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(T ) and Seq(d ) ⊆ CN(T ). Thus, CN(T ) is inconsistent. Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let H be an argumentation system which satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments. From Proposition 12, ∀E ∈ Ext(H) Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)). Since H satisfies consistency, ∀E ∈ Ext(H) Concs(E) is consistent. Thus, so is for CN(Th(E)).
Proof of Proposition 7
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that ∅ ∈ Ext(H). Thus, Output(H) = ∅. Assume that H satisfies strict precedence, then CN((F, S, ∅)) ⊆ Output(H). Since ∈ F and from Property 3, it holds that F ⊆ CN((F, S, ∅)), then ∈ Output(H). R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) . Assume that H satisfies consistency and strict precedence. From Property 13, it holds that Output(H) is consistent. From strict precedence, CN((F, S, ∅)) ⊆ Output(H). Thus, CN((F, S, ∅) ) is consistent.
Proof of Proposition 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Proof of Proposition 9
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). Assume that H is closed under sub-arguments and satisfies exhaustiveness. Let E ∈ Ext(H). From the monotonicity of Arg, it holds that E ⊆ Arg(Th(E)).
Proof of Proposition 10
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). Assume that H satisfies exhaustiveness and strict precedence. Since H satisfies strict precedence,
Proof of Proposition 11
In order to prove the compatibility of the postulates, it is sufficient to give an example of a system which satisfies all the five postulates. This system is ASPIC as defined in [17] . Proposition 1 in [17] shows that the system is closed under sub-arguments under any Dung's semantics. Proposition 8 in [17] shows that the system is closed under strict rules under complete semantics, thus under stable semantics. Property 2 in [17] shows that the system satisfies consistency under any Dung's semantics. From Proposition 13, the system satisfies exhaustiveness. Let us now show that the system satisfies strict precedence. This follows from the definition of attack relation (Definition 16 in [17] ) according to which a strict argument cannot be attacked. Thus, it belongs to any stable extension.
Proof of Proposition 12
Let H be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ where Ext(H) is its set of extensions under an extension-based semantics. Assume that H is closed under sub-arguments and let E ∈ Ext(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z ).
Proof of Proposition 13
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments. Assume that H violates exhaustiveness. Thus, there exists E ∈ Ext n (H) and there exists a
is inconsistent. Thus, ∃y ∈ Seq(d) such that ¬y ∈ d . But, y, ¬y ∈ CN(Th(E)). Since H is closed under sub-arguments, CN(Th(E)) = Concs(E). Thus, y, ¬y ∈ Concs(E). This contradicts the fact that H satisfies consistency.
Proof of Proposition 14
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under subarguments. From Proposition 13, H satisfies exhaustiveness. From Proposition 9, it follows that for all E ∈ Ext n (H), E = Arg(Th(E)).
Proof of Proposition 15
The proof is similar to that of Propositions 13 and 14. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Let T be a theory and d
For r k = σ , the former implies the latter hence r i = r k whenever i = k. Thus, depriving 
As above, a contradiction arises.
(←−) Assume that d is a focused derivation schema from T such that x n = x. By the definitions, x ∈ L and d is a derivation schema for x from T . Due to the hypothesis in the statement of the theorem, Seq(d) is consistent. Assume that there exists Proof Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that CN((F, S, ∅) ) is consistent. Assume that R is conflict-dependent and privileges strict arguments. 
Assume that for every strict a ∈ Sub(a),
is inconsistent, say y ∈ Head(Def(d)) and ¬y ∈ Head(Def(d ) ) . Should no such y be in F ∪Head (S) , then there would be a preferred
That is, there exists a = (d , x ) ∈ Sub(a) such that a is strict and R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that CN((F, S, ∅) ) is consistent. Assume that R is conflict-dependent and privileges strict arguments.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),
We show first that Arg(Free(T )) is conflict-free. From Property 8,
Let us now show that Arg(Free(T )) defends its elements. Assume that ∃a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(Free(T )) and ∃b = (d , x ) ∈ Arg(T ) such that bRa. From Lemma 1, there exists a = (d , x ) ∈ Sub(a) such that a is strict, hence a ∈ Arg(Free(T )), and a Rb. (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext(H) = ∅. Assume that H satisfies strict precedence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments. Let E ∈ Ext(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z ).
Proof of Theorem 3 Let H = (Arg
Since H is closed under sub-arguments, Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)) by Proposition 12. Hence, r 1 ), . . . , (x n , r n ) for x from (F, S, Z ). There are two cases: (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
Consequently, a, b ∈ E, this contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free (since it is a naive extension).
Assume now that for all a ∈ Arg((F, S, ∅)), b ∈ Arg(T ) such that aRb or bRa. This means that arguments of Arg( (F, S, ∅) ) are not attacked. Thus, they belong to every naive extension.
Proof of Theorem 6
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory 
Proof of Theorem 7
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub- 
Proof of Theorem 8
This contradicts the fact that O is an option.
From Proposition 1, it follows that for all
O, O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), if CN(O) = CN(O ) = Concs(E), then O = O .
Proof of Theorem 9
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under subarguments.
Proof of Theorem 10
Proof of Theorem 11
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency, strict precedence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments. Let us show that Let us now show that
This means that O ∈ POpt(T ) (since it contains all consequences of the strict part of T ) . This contradicts the fact that O is a maximal preferred option. Consequently, R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under subarguments. From Property 11, Output(H) = R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) 
Arg(O) ∈ Ext n (H). From Theorem 8, O ∈ Max(Opt(T )).
Proof of Theorem 12 Let H = (Arg(T ),
CN(O i ).
Lemma 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Proof of Theorem 17
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R ∈ s 3 . From Property 11,
CN(O i ).
Proof of Theorem 20 Let H = (Arg(T ),
Output(H) = E i ∈Ext s (H)
Concs(E i ). 
Proof of Theorem 21
Let H be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that H satisfies the strict precedence postulate, i.e., F ⊆ Output(H). Since ∈ F , Output(H) = ∅. Hence, Ext p (H) = {∅}.
Proof of Theorem 22
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates. Let E ∈ Ext p (H) and 
Proof of Theorem 23
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) such that R is conflict-dependent and privileges strict arguments, and H satisfies consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under sub-arguments. From consistency and strict precedence, it follows by Proposition 8 that CN((F, S, ∅)) is consistent.
The conclusion of the theorem, i.e., Arg(Free(T )) ⊆ E i ∈Ext p (H) E i , is trivial in the case that Arg(Free(T )) is empty. Consider a ∈ Arg(Free( T ) 
Proof of Theorem 27
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F, S, D) . Assume that R ∈ p 2 . 
This means that
Def(d) ⊆ n i=1 D i . Consequently, d is also a derivation schema from (F, S, n i=1 D i ) = n i=1 O i . Finally, (d, x) ∈ Arg( n i=1 O i ). Assume now that (d, x) ∈ Arg( n i=1 O i ).
Proof of Corollary 8 It follows immediately from Theorem 26.
Proof of Corollary 9 It follows immediately from Theorems 17, 13 and 16.
Proof of Corollary 10
Let H = (Arg (T ) , R) be an argumentation system over a theory T such that R ∈ p 2 and privileges strict arguments. From Theorem 29, IE(H) = Arg(Free(T )). Then, Output(H) = Concs(IE(H)) = Concs(Arg (Free(T )) ). Since CN(Free(T )) is consistent, CN(Free(T )) = Concs(Arg (Free(T ) 
)).
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